Canadian Honeynet - Report 7

Report(7) Captured from 10-03-2018 to 23-03-2018

1-Introduction

The first honeypot studies released by Clifford Stoll in 1990, and from April 2008 the Canadian Honeynet chapter was founded at the University of New Brunswick, NB, Canada. UNB is a member of the Honeynet Project, an international non-profit security research organization.

In computer terminology, a honeypot is a trap set to detect, deflect or in some manner counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information systems. Generally, honeypots essentially turn the tables for Hackers and Computer Security Experts. They consist of a computer, data or a network site that appears to be part of a network, but is isolated, and seems to contain information or a resource that would be of value to attackers.

There are some benefits of having a honeypot:

•       Observe hackers in action and learn about their behavior

•       Gather intelligence on attack vectors, malware, and exploits. Use that intel to train your IT staff

•       Create profiles of hackers that are trying to gain access to your systems

•       Improve your security posture

•       Waste hackers’ time and resources

•       Reduced False Positive

•       Cost Effective

Our primary objectives are to gain insight into the security threats, vulnerabilities and behavior of the attackers, investigate tactics and practices of the hacker community and share learned lessons with the IT community, appropriate forums in academia and law enforcement in Canada. So, CIC decided to use cutting edge technology to collect a dataset for Honeynet which includes honeypots on the inside and outside of our network.

These reports are generated based on the weekly traffic. For more information and requesting the weekly captured data, please contact us at a.habibi.l@unb.ca.

 

2- Technical Setup

In the CIC-Honeynet dataset, we have defined a separated network with these services:

·         Email Server(SMTP-IMAP)(Mailoney)

·         FTP Server(Dianaee)

·         SFTP(Cowrie)

·         File Server(Dianaee)

·         Web Server (Apache:WordPress-MySql)

·         SSH(Kippo,Cowrie)

·         Http (Dianaee)

·         RDP(Rdpy)

·         VNC(Vnclowpot)

Inside the network there are ‘like’ real users. Each user has real behaviors and surfs the Internet based on the above protocols. The web server is accessible to the public and anyone who can see the website. In the inside network, we put pfsense firewall at the edge of network and NAT different services for public users. There is a firewall that some ports such as 20, 21, 22, 53, 80, 143, 443 are opened intentionally to capture and absorb attackers behaviours. Also, there are some weak policies for PCs such as setting common passwords. The real generated data on PCs is mirrored through TAPs for capturing and monitoring by TCPDump.

Furthermore, we add WordPress 4.9.4 and MySQL as database to publish some content on the website. The content of website is news and we have formed kind of honeypot inside of contact form. So, when the bots want to produce spams, we can grab these spams through “Contact Form 7 Honeypot”(Figure 1).

Figure1: Contact Form 7 Honeypot

CIC-honeynet uses T-POT tool outside firewall which is equipped with several tools. T-Pot is based on well-established honeypot daemons which includes IDS and other tools for attack submission.

The idea behind T-Pot is to create a system, which defines the entire TCP network range as well as some important UDP services as a honeypot. It forwards all incoming attack traffic to the best suited honeypot daemons in order to respond and process it. T-Pot includes docker versions of the following honeypots:

• Conpot,
• Cowrie,
• Dionaea,
• Elasticpot,
• Emobility,
• Glastopf,
• Honeytrap,
• Mailoney,
• Rdpy and
• Vnclowpot

Figure 2 demonstrates the network structure of CIC-honeynet and installed security tools. There are two TAPs for capturing network activities. Outside the firewall, there is T-POT which captures the users’ activities through external-TAP. Behind the pfsense firewall in the internal network Security Onion has been used to analyse the captured data through internal-TAP. It is a Linux distro for intrusion detection, network security monitoring, and log management. It’s based on Ubuntu and contains Snort, Suricata, Bro, OSSEC, Sguil, Squert, ELSA, Xplico, NetworkMiner, and other security tools.

In the internal network 3 PCs are running the CIC-Benign behaviour generator (an in house developed agent), includes internet surfing, FTP uploading and downloading, and Emailing activities. Also, four servers include Webserver with WordPress and MySQL, Email Server (Postfix), File Server (Openmediavault) and SSH Server have been installed for different common services. We will change our firewall structure to test different brands every month.

Figure2: Network Diagram

All traffic captured through the internal-TAP and external-TAP and analysis by CICFlowMeter which extracts more than 80 traffic features. The source code of CICFlowMeter is available in GitHub.

Also we used Kippo tools to mimic the SSH command inside the firewall and captures the users commands. Some easy password such as 1234, 123… are entered in Kippo database to make it vulnerable for attackers.

 

3- T-POT Report (External-TAP)

3.1 login attempts

We analyzed the IP addresses that made login attempts using the T-POT. The top ten countries that we recieved login attempts from are listed in Table 1.

Table1: IP breakdown by country

 

In Table2, top 10 of source IP address and the number of attack are demonstrated.

  Table2: Top 10 Source IP

In figure3, top 5 of countries are demonstrated by related ports. For example the attacks from Russia have been 48.49% through port 5900, 27.35% through port 2222, 12.59% through port 443, 10.86% through port 25 and 0.71% through port 80.

Figure3: Honeypot by country and port

3.1 Webserver and VNC attacks with related CVEs 

During this week, we had two CVEs namely, CVE-2003-0567 and CVE-2017-0143 which the number of attacks for each CVE are demonstrated in Table3.

  Table3: Top 10 Source IP

The location of attackers based on the IPs presented on Figure 4.

Figure4: The approximate locations of the IP addresses

Based on T-POT the 78.39% of attacks are from addresses with a bad reputation, while only 21.18% are from known attackers (figure5).

Figure5: External Honeypot source IP Reputation

In Figure 6, some attacks on NGINX webserver have been presented.

Figure6: attacks on NGINX

The VNC attacks listed in T-POT have been shown in Table 4 which around 149583 of them are from Master-Integration Ltd.

Table4: Top 10 Source IP of VNC attack

	username		Number of occurrence
222.186.174.93		80948
185.232.30.101		31661
109.248.46.99		29556
109.248.46.71		27652
109.248.46.113		26635
109.248.46.79		26606
109.248.46.12		26405

 

 

 

 

3.3 TOP Username and password for brute force attack

For brute force attacks, attackers most frequently used the usernames and passwords which are listed in table 5 and 6:

Table5: common username used by attackers

	username	Number of occurrence
	root	78358
	0	69682
	admin	24944
	1234	19077
	enable	6201
	shell	6158
	guest	3300
	supervisor	2030
	default	1921
	user	1545

 

 

Table6: common password used by attackers

password	Number of occurrence
[blank]		71914
1234		23390
system		6212
sh		6158
admin		3576
12345		3364
password		3301
123456		2315
user		2315
7ujMko0admin	2180

 

 

3.4 TOP Commands

Table 7 and 8, show the most common commands used by attackers in Cowrie and Mailoney external honeypots. (All commands are available in captured data)

Table7: common command used by attackers grabbed by Cowrie

	command	Number of occurrence
1	export HISTFILE=/dev/null	69
2	export HISTFILESIZE=0	69
3	export HISTSIZE=0	69
4	history -n	69
5	unset HISTORY HISTFILE HISTSAVE HISTZONE HISTORY HISTLOG WATCH	69
6	unset HISTORY HISTFILE HISTSAVE HISTZONE HISTORY HISTLOG WATCH ; history -n ; export HISTFILE=/dev/null ; export HISTSIZE=0; export HISTFILESIZE=0;	66
7	/gweerwe323f	56
8	cat /proc/cpuinfo	48

 

Table8: common command used by attackers grabbed by Mailoney

	command	Number of occurrence
1	AUTH LOGIN	443
2	EHLO 205.174.165.74	311
3	QUIT	136
4	HELO mailserver	122
5	EHLO User	28
6	DATA	9
7	RSET	9
8	HELO *.*	8
9	STARTTLS	8
10	AaAaAa	6

 

 

4. Internal Honeypot

As we talked in section2, Inside of our network, Security Onion  is capturing the number of attacks which is demonstrated in Figure 7. Also we can prove it in Squert and SGUIL which are tools of Security Onion to exactly detect attackers (figure 9, 10, 11, 12). The only difference here is that we intentionally opened some ports on the firewall and when attackers pass the firewall, they face real network. Inside the firewall, as we mentioned in section2, we have 3 PCs and 4 servers for different services. By analysing captured data through Security Onion, we get different result than from section 3.

Figure7: Traffic requested by users

Figure8: users traffic inside network

 

 

Inside network, on port 22 we had 4215 attacks which is demonstrated on Figure 9.

Figure9: Traffic on SSH port

 

As it is mentioned, we have seen 10% SSH BruteForce attack with fake PUTTY and other protocol of TCP. We didn’t see this kind of attack on external honeypot (T-POT) (figure 10,11,12).

Figure10: Squert summary for attacks

 

 

 

Figure11: Squert shows different attacks on Sat 10^th of March

 

 

 

Figure12: attack on SGUIL tools